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Subprime mortgages meltdown and the behaviour of Central Banks*
How near of a financial crisis and thus of an economic crisis tout court, are we? The answer 
to this question depends a lot on the behaviour of Central Bankers. To understand why, a 
brief description of the present situation is in order. 
At the outset there is the crisis of the subprime mortgage market in the US, which is rather 
small in size. The contagion to other compartments of the credit market, and eventually to the 
stock exchange arose for two reasons. The first is securitization of private debt which by 
itself is an intelligent way of spreading the risks so as to allow access to credit by a larger 
number of borrowers. It significantly reduces the amount of credit rationing in the economy. 
The structured finance markets allow thus the issuance of asset backed securities (ABS) and 
in particular asset backed commercial paper (ABCP).  Usually most of ABCP are diversified, 
relying on a rather wide mix of assets, among which one can find in small proportion 
residential mortgage loans. Usually also, liquidity, in the case of an inability to roll (to pay 
CP on time) due to a market disruption is provided by bank liquidity facilities. Canada was a 
special case where the liquidity facilities are not as strong; the banks refused to pay, but 
market participants worked out rescue plans among themselves that will allow these conduits 
to be unwound over time. Some programs however are single sellers extendible ABCP, 
backed by mortgage collateral. But many of these programmes are insulated from market 
value declines by market values swap, which will ultimately protect investors; yet the banks 
have to buy the CP or the long-term assets that the conduits own, and the amounts are huge –
ABCP programmes deleveraged by an average of €10 billion per day for the last three weeks 
of August.  Other CP programmes lack structural protection and the investors may not get all 
their money or have to wait a long time before they do. Now one can understand why the loss 
of confidence in the latter propagates to all segments of the ABCP market, creating a 
liquidity crisis. The main responsibility for this contagion, and the second, but the true reason 
for the crisis, is borne by the credit rating agencies which did not properly distinguish 
between the different kinds of ABCP programs, because they were blindly believing in their 
sophisticated models. “Once the market lost confidence in rating agency models following 
the subprime debacle, the CP didn’t look so safe.” (Richard Robb)1
Hence the stepping in of Central Banks and especially the ECB was a proper reaction but it 
was obviously not sufficient. If confidence is lost because the market participants become 
conscious of their imperfect knowledge, the players would unlikely lend to each other. That 
arose even between banks themselves increasing the opacity of the risk structure of their 
assets. What begun as a liquidity crisis may well degenerate in a solvency one that could be 
stopped only by a decrease of the rate of interest. Apparently the President of the FED 
understood this point as testifies his decision of cutting the refinancing rate.  The gesture was 
more important than its content, because of the expectations it led to. 
In Europe things are moving more slowly in a context which requires exactly the reverse: a 
crystal clear discourse and a quick decision by the Lender of Last Resort. Only transparency 
and action can take care of a confidence crisis. At the contrary, the discourse of the President 
of the ECB is all but clear, as it sticks to its pre-crisis wording of the possibility of an interest 
rate hike, adding some obscure considerations about the consequences of the financial market 
turmoil in a way which is not increasing our understanding. What seems to be clear from his 
message is that the crisis helped to return to a normal pricing of risks. What was abnormal 
according to his view was the flattening of the interest rate curve in the pre-crisis period. 
  
* I am indebted to Richard Robb and Roman Frydman for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
1 This is a quote from a mail sent to me by Richard Robb, Columbia University. 
7There may even be some truth in this statement, but it does not help to cure a confidence 
crisis.
What may explain this European specificity is a convergence of two ex-ante contradictories 
lines of thought. The first seeing any alleviation of “the pain” of the market as a reward to  
speculators, the second stemming from the strong believers in general equilibrium economic 
theory according to which the variation in asset prices is just reflecting an exogenous shock, 
“a reduced appetite for risk”. Whatever their widely different roots the two lines of thought 
converges towards the conclusion that nothing has to be done, as if such passivity would not 
arm the “real economy”. And indeed the question is phrased in those terms: will the subprime 
crisis affect the real economy? Of course, it will: how can one imagine, even for a second, 
that a decrease of asset prices (especially housing prices) and an increase in the average rate 
of interest (through an increase in the risk premium) would not have negative consequences 
on growth and employment? As Chairman Ben S. Bernanke put it: “It is not the responsibility 
of the Federal Reserve – nor would it be appropriate – to protect lenders and investors from 
the consequences of their financial decisions. But developments in financial markets can 
have broad economic effects felt by many outside the markets, and the Federal Reserve must 
take those effects into account when determining policy”2. It is only recently on August 27 in 
Budapest, that President Trichet corrected its preceding statements – "What I said was before 
the market turbulence" – letting us know that the ECB is paying close attention to the 
liquidity crisis and may not tighten on Sep 6.
The ECB understands its mission as one of anchoring inflation expectations around its 
inflation goal.  It does not seem to fully understand that it has also the duty of managing 
expectations about the real economy. Now what has been termed colourfully “a reduced 
appetite for risk” may well reflect a radical shift in expectations about the real economy. In 
this context, raising interest rate would not be a sign of independence from the ECB, but the 
sign that it is misunderstanding its role.
This episode reflects also the obvious, but not widely recognised fact that we are leaving in 
an imperfect knowledge world, one where uncertainty is pervasive. In this word, the 
informations for a perfectly rational calculus are just missing, and the framework of dominant 
economic theory can’t be applied. (See on these questions the remarkable book by Roman 
Frydman and Michael Goldberg: Imperfect Knowledge economics: Exchange Rates and 
Risks). This applies in particular to financial markets whose role is supposed to coordinate 
future intertemporal plans relative to saving and investment. In such a world, notwithstanding 
moral hazard problems, the main task of a Central Banker is to re-establish confidence by 
making known by all means that he will not leave the real economy to be affected by the 
sudden disruption of financial markets. 
To summarize:
1. It was wise for the ECB to provide the market with liquidities
2. It was not appropriate to speak to the market in such an obscure way
3. The normal reaction of the ECB should to reconsider its former discourse of “strong 
vigilance” (August 2) and not to tighten at its 6september meeting. If the real economy in 
Europe starts to slow, there will be plenty of time to decrease the rate of interest. Monetary 
policy has to take into account the different shocks to the economy among which a financial 
shock can be the gravest, as it is generally reflecting a shift in expectations about the real 
economy. It is the only policy instrument which can be applied timely taking into account 
new information stemming from the very functioning of markets.
  
2 Remarks at the Federal Bank of Kansas City’s Economic Symposium, August 31, 2007: “Housing, Housing 
Finance, and Monetary Policy”. 
